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Introduction.
The Promise and Perils of Innovation 
in Cross-Border Procurement
by
Gabriella M. Racca
Professor of Administrative Law, University of Turin
Christopher R. Yukins
Professor of Government Procurement Law  
The George Washington University Law School
This is a time of transition in procurement law, a time for new beginnings, 
and for rethinking old approaches in an increasingly globalized economy. 
Recognizing these enormous changes underway in our discipline, this volume 
seeks to capture some of the best ideas, from some of the leading academic 
writers and practitioners in our field.
1. Innovation in Procurement:
Its Meanings, and How It Is Addressed 
in this Book
This volume centers on ‘innovation in procurement’, which can mean many 
things. (1)
The first, of course, is the purchase of innovation: buying cutting-edge tech-
nology in public procurement markets.
A second meaning of ‘innovation in procurement’ is encouraging innovative 
suppliers in the procurement process.
A third meaning is innovation in the procurement process itself: new methods 
and approaches for the procurement process.
The book deals with all of them, and they are often variously mixed, as for 
example in the cases of the networks of Centralized Purchasing Bodies in the 
EU (which use innovative procurement measures to spur development), and 
the use of the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program to advance 
 (1) See, e.g., P. Smith, “Innovation Procurement – What Exactly Does It Mean?”, Public Spend
Forum, May 2017.
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technological innovation in the United States, a program which Santerre-
Funderburg and co-editor Yukins assess in their chapter.
While the EU and the U.S. landscapes for encouraging innovation in 
procurement are very different, the two systems’ emerging issues and concerns 
are often the same.
Interestingly, the working EU definition for innovation, that is, the “imple-
mentation of a new marketing method, or a new organisational method in busi-
ness practices, workplace organisation or external relations, inter alia, with the 
purpose of helping to solve societal challenges or to support the Europe 2020 
strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth,” (2) is echoed in one of the 
generally accepted procurement goals in the U.S. federal administration, that 
is, to focus on ‘innovative acquisition methods’, with a view to new ways of 
doing things that can enhance performance. (3) According to the Office of Inno-
vation and Technology in the U.S. city of Philadelphia, a subject of the analysis 
by Laurence Folliot-Lalliot and Peter McKeen in their chapter on procurement 
and smart cities, innovation focuses on “[d]eveloping and sustaining innova-
tive technology practices within the City through engaging and empowering 
citizens, improving business processes, working collaboratively and constantly 
searching for new opportunities”. (4) This book, therefore, tries to add value in 
the on-going debate on how public procurement across borders ‘innovates’ in 
what seems to be a common direction, regardless of jurisdiction.
1.1. Purchase of innovation
Purchasing new or significantly improved products, services or processes 
of production, building or construction is the first meaning of innovation in 
procurement. Several chapters in this book focus on the use of public procure-
ment in obtaining “technologically-advanced and innovative products and 
services at better prices”, more particularly, the chapters by Jean-Bernard 
Auby, Laurence Folliot-Lalliot and Peter McKeen, and Giuseppe Franco 
Ferrari on smart cities. (5)
Ferrari highlights the role of ‘smartness in the cities’ in the development of 
procurement regulations and policies, i.e., from an intelligent city to a future 
‘cyber-civic’ city. He emphasizes the importance of enhancing the capacity of 
 (2) Art. 2, § 1(22), Dir. 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 
2014 on public procurement and repealing Dir. 2004/18/EC.
 (3) S. Kelman, “Reinventing government, 25 years on: has the procurement system improved?”, 
PPLR, 2018, 3, p. 101.
 (4) See L. Folliot Lalliot and P.T. McKeen, “Procurement and Smart Cities: Exploring Examples 
on Both Sides of the Atlantic”, Chapter 7 in this book.
 (5) See J.-B. Auby, “Public Contracts and Smart Cities”; L. Folliot Lalliot and P.T. McKeen, 
“Procurement and Smart Cities: Exploring Examples on Both Sides of the Atlantic”; G.F. Ferrari, 
“Smartness and the Cities”, Chapters 6, 7, 5 in this book.
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a smart city to use artificial intelligence in the performance of its sociological 
function such as governance, attracting business, and even facilitating demo-
cratic processes for the establishment of innovative regulations, not only in 
government contracting but also in the advancement of the highest social and 
environmental protections.
Although Jean‑Bernard Auby negates the presence of an exclusive definition 
for the ‘smart cities’ movement, he shares Ferrari’s analysis on the phases of its 
implementation by asserting the role of a ‘triple set of transformation’ – trans-
formation of infrastructures, the growing importance of digitalization and data, 
and changes in governance – in the evolution of smart cities. He claims that the 
transformation of the urban infrastructure (‘meta-infrastructures’), digitization 
and data (‘smart procurement’), and changes in governance (new public-private 
partnership arrangements) will likely change urban public contracting in smart 
cities. He further explains the possible long-term consequences of the transfor-
mation in the urban functioning (i.e., becoming ‘smart cities’) in the categories 
of contracts, that is, urban public contracting in smart cities is leaning toward 
a multi-party system. More parties will be assembled both on the part of the 
contracting authorities and a wider range of contractors, complex contracts, i.e., 
more (functionally) global contracts, and long-term contracts, so that contrac-
tors’ responsibility will extend beyond the completion of the infrastructure 
project to include its overall management in a given period of time.
The chapter by Folliot-Lalliot and McKeen explores some of the innova-
tive procurement techniques that have been adopted in cities that are actively 
promoting smart development in the US and EU. In particular, they under-
line the special clauses, concerning data collection, data release policy, data 
protection, and dissemination in contracts for smart cities, which in the case 
of the City of Philadelphia, US, have resulted in the promotion of FastFWD, 
an innovative public procurement concept. Under FastFWD, the City gathers 
data across departments on a given problem and then will, where, possible, 
describe that problem in a manner suited to creative solutions (“problem-
based procurement methods and practices”). Once the need is identified, a 
multi-phase process follows, with an initial request for solutions for the identi-
fied need. This effort has attracted new companies and small businesses, with 
innovative ideas.
In the end, the procurement of ‘innovative’ products and services for the 
development of smart cities is a “key component in the creation and manage-
ment of smart cities, and effective city governance structures influence its 
success”. (6) The discussion presented in the above-mentioned chapters on 
 (6) See, e.g., N. Vergoulias, “Smart cities: is cutting-edge technology the method to achieving 
global sustainable goals?”, in J. Envtl. L. & Litig., 2017, 32, p. 272.
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smart cities is an example of how the procurement of innovative products, 
services and works, e.g., procurement of new technology collaborations for 
traffic congestion, and crime prevention in local communities in the US, calls 
for new practices in public procurement such as the development of smart 
public-private collaboration. (7)
Other equally important approaches are laid down in the EU Directive on 
Public Procurement. In fact, Recital 47 of the Directive is very clear in encou-
raging public authorities to use public procurement to spur innovation; it 
states in part:
“Buying innovative products, works and services plays a key role in improving 
the efficiency and quality of public services while addressing major societal 
challenges. It contributes to achieving best value for public money as well as 
wider economic, environmental and societal benefits in terms of generating 
new ideas, translating them into innovative products and services and thus 
promoting sustainable economic growth”. (8)
In addition to the different approaches to innovation, i.e., pre-commercial 
procurement, the new Directives promote other models such as the use of 
public procurement for innovation (PPI) and innovation partnerships in helping 
Member States to ensure the promotion of “sustainable high-quality public 
services in Europe.” Through the EU’s public procurement of innovation, a 
procuring entity can act as the “launch customer or early adopter” for pro ducts 
and services that either are not available on the market, or have yet to reach a 
significant market share. (9) Some of the successful PPI projects are discussed in 
the chapter by Cavallo Perin and co-editor Racca. Interestingly, their chapter 
argues that central purchasing bodies had already experienced challenges 
in promoting innovative forms of cross-border administrative cooperation, 
according to European and national principles, even before the implementation 
of the 2014 Directive. In this regard, among the most advanced and innovative 
joint procurement experiences, the “Healthy Ageing Public Procurement of 
Innovations” (HAPPI) project (10) provided one of the first joint cross‑border 
procurements to buy innovative solutions to promote healthy ageing. This 
experience stands out (11) for having combined product innovation (“what 
 (7) See L. Folliot-Lalliot and P. McKeen, “Procurement and smart cities: exploring examples on 
both sides of the Atlantic”, Chapter 7 in this book.
 (8) Recital no. 47, Dir. 2014/24/EU.
 (9) M. Blay, “The Strategic Use of Public Procurement in Support of Innovation”, EPPPLR, 2014, 
9, pp. 3-11.
 (10) BBG and SKI, Feasibility study concerning the actual implementation of a joint cross­border 
procurement procedure by public buyers from different Member States, 2017, pp. 33 et seq.
 (11) As recently recognized by the EU Commission, Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of 
the Regions, “Making public procurement work in and for Europe”, Strasbourg, COM (2017) 572 final, 
October 2017.
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to buy”) in order to share the risks connected to the purchase of innovative 
solutions in the field of active ageing with a significant innovation of the 
procurement process, jointly designed and conducted by Central Purchasing 
Bodies (CPBs) (partners in the project) of different Member States (‘how to 
buy’). The choice was to establish a European Purchasing Group which 
delegated the intermediary functions to the French CPB for the conclusion of 
a closed framework agreement with one economic operator, in accordance with 
EU and French law, with a combined effort of harmonization.
From the same perspective, Valcarcel shows how PPI can trigger the promo-
tion of aggregation in public procurement among EU Member States. Citing 
various examples such as the project on the “Distributed European Commu-
nity Individual Patient Healthcare Electronic Record” (DECIPHER) and 
the “Public Administration Procurement Innovation to Reach Ultimate 
Sustainability” (PAPIRUS), she highlights the role of collaborative and joint 
cross border procurement for buying innovative solutions. In the DECIPHER 
project, several EU Member States (i.e., Spain, Italy, United Kingdom and 
Finland) formed a consortium in conjunction with technology suppliers to 
define the technological solutions in health sectors which promote the use of 
mobile applications for ease of access of health data, which is an innovative 
product that has been developed during pre-commercial public procurement.
The chapter by Racolța and Dragos elaborates on the importance of inno-
vation partnership in promoting research, development and innovation (RDI) 
in the EU by comparing it with another legal instrument, State aid for RDI. 
They discuss the relationship between these two instruments, including the 
opportunities and challenges for the use of each. Depending on the level of 
policy design, the specifics of legal regimes make the use of public procurement 
and State aid desirable in promoting RDI in different settings. Unlike State 
aid RDI, RDI under Article 31 of the EU Directive on innovation partnership 
allows the contracting authorities and the innovator-participants to agree on 
the subsequent purchase by the contracting authority of the resulting supplies, 
services or works that meet the authority’s required performance levels within 
a maximum cost. In essence, the prospect of future procurement helps fuel 
research and development.
The procurement of innovative products is not a practice peculiar only to 
the European Union. It has become a common strategy among procuring enti-
ties across the globe. In the United States, for example, the promotion of inno-
vative products is tied to a policy favoring advancement of small enterprises 
through the federal government’s Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) 
initiative. The chapter of Santerre-Funderburg and co-editor Yukins discusses 
how the U.S. SBIR program fosters innovation among small businesses by 
BRUYLANT
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funding concepts at their earliest stages and then granting a procurement pref-
erence as those concepts are commercialized. Notably, the U.S. SBIR strategy 
is in many ways the forerunner to the European initiative on “innovation part-
nerships”; Christophe Kronke’s piece discusses the goals and contours of that 
initiative in the European Union while Ponzio’s chapter highlights the critical-
ities among PCP and PPI as addressed in the innovation partnership model, 
possibly taking advantage of knowing in advance the criticalities of the U.S. 
experience in SBIR.
Asian countries have also encouraged the procurement of innovative 
pro ducts through the promotion of the use of high-level technology (HLT). 
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has already launched the “High-Level 
Technology Fund” with an objective of assisting ADB’s developing member 
countries to adopt high-level technology and innovative solutions through 
the acquisition of equipment and goods that employ HLT, construction or 
civil works based on specifications that require contractors to meet enhanced 
performance standards and/or employ HLT in the construction process, mate-
rials and other inputs; and the hiring of consultants with specific knowledge 
and expertise in the use of HLT. (12) As of December 2018, the ADB High Tech-
nology Fund had financed thirteen (13) projects for the acquisition of HLT 
projects such as implementing innovative approaches for water governance in 
Mongolia which promotes the acquisition of HLT technology on groundwater 
quality and quantity monitoring systems. Molino’s chapter summarizes the 
other innovations in public procurement that the ADB is currently promoting 
in its Member States.
Irrespective of approach, a successful purchase for innovation requires an 
intensive market consultation, an argument posited by Lopez in his paper, 
“Preliminary Market Consultation in Innovation Procurement: a principled 
approach and incentives for anticompetitive behaviours” and supported by 
Gimeno Feliu in his extensive analysis of the EU’s procurement reform as a 
strategy for the development of innovation policy; more particularly, his argu-
ments on leveraging the purchasing power by the EU public procurers in 
acquiring innovative products and services in order to improve the efficiency 
and quality of public services with a view to promoting the Europe 2020 plan 
for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth.
 (12) Asian Development Bank, “High-Level Technology Guidance Note on Procurement”, June 2018.
BRUYLANT
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1.2. Innovation in Procurement
A second meaning of ‘innovation in procurement’ is encouraging innovative 
suppliers in the procurement process (13) – to encourage those that will provide 
innovative solutions, rather than simply low price. This tension between low 
price and best value divides modern procurement, for while most systems 
presumptively favor awards based on low price, as they are simpler and pose less 
corruption risk, more advanced procurement systems typically strive towards 
more subjective best-value awards and broader value-based approaches which 
embrace innovation and yet also entail further risks and require special evalu-
ating capacities.
What is interesting about this approach is that while most of the innova-
tive solutions in public procurement address the issues from the demand side 
(collaborative procurement, for example, encourages the use of collective 
purchasing power among public authorities, or the use of e-procurement to 
leverage technology for a more efficient administrative procedure), the move 
to encourage innovation through procurement is shifting the so-called ‘burden’ 
to innovate to the supply side. (14)
One leading example is the use of Building Information Modelling (BIM) 
for the procurement of construction or work services, a topic that is exten-
sively discussed in the chapter of Di Guida and co-editor Racca. Under the 
traditional approach to public procurement, collaboration between and among 
contractors or economic operators, unless they will participate as a single 
offeror by submitting a single bid or proposal in a particular project as a joint-
venture or consortium, is often highly regulated, if not totally prohibited. The 
reason for this is that collaboration among them poses a high risk for potential 
bid-rigging or may even trigger the possibility of creating a harmful collusion 
or worse corruption in the market, which would contravene the overarching 
principle of open competition in public procurement. (15) BIM, on the other 
hand, encourages collaboration even among contractors through the estab-
lishment of what is known as a ‘framework alliance’ or a contract between 
 (13) See S. Kelman, “Meet the Contracting Folks Who are Encouraging New IT Vendors”, Public 
Spend Forum, March 2018.
 (14) G.L. Albano, “Demand aggregation and collusion prevention in public procurement”, in Inte­
grity and Efficiency in Sustainable Public Contracts. Balancing Corruption Concerns in Public  Procurement 
Internationally (G.M. Racca and C.R. Yukins eds), Brussels, Bruylant, 2014, p. 155; G.L. Albano and 
C. Nicholas, The Law and Economics of Framework Agreements, Cambridge, CUP, 2016.
 (15) A. Sánchez Graells, “Prevention and deterrence of bid rigging: a look from the new EU 
directive on public procurement”, in Integrity and Efficiency in Sustainable Public Contracts. Balancing 
Corruption Concerns in Public Procurement Internationally, op. cit., p. 171; A. López Miño and 
P. Valcarcel Fernandez, “Contracting authorities’ inability to fight bid rigging in public procurement: 
reasons and remedies”, in Integrity and Efficiency in Sustainable Public Contracts. Balancing Corruption 
Concerns in Public Procurement Internationally, op. cit., p. 199.
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“one or more suppliers in order to establish the terms governing the project 
contracts that are awarded over an agreed period”, (16) albeit, not necessarily 
creating a single proposal or bid among parties therein. While a framework 
agreement is used in times when the contracting officer has an open‑ended for 
the products or services, subject to the framework agreement, the framework 
alliance is an agreement between and among suppliers or contractors within 
a supply chain, though they may not necessarily be within the same line of 
industry. For example, in the supply chain for building construction, an alli-
ance may be formed among a group of architects for the design, another group 
of engineers for the building phase, and a new group of economic operators 
for future construction  maintenance. An Alliance Manager, supported by the 
new technologies (smart contracts,  blockchain), should assure the right incen-
tives for all the alliance partners to further the common goal of a prompt and 
efficient execution, overcoming the opportunistic behavior of suppliers after 
the award.
Another important approach under this category is the innovation in 
public procurement under the Egyptian public private partnership (PPP) 
legislation. While establishing a public private partnership is, more often 
than not, exempted from the coverage of public procurement legislation, (17) 
Judge Ismail explains that the Egyptian legislation governing PPPs stipu-
lates that investor selection is subject to the principles of publicity, trans-
parency, free competition, equal opportunity, and equality. Although there 
is no special administrative organ in Egypt that is concerned with State 
procurement, the PPP legislation stipulates that a special pre‑qualifica-
tion committee shall be established by an administrative decree from the 
concerned authority, and to maintain fair competition and equality the 
administrative authority may use a ‘dialogue process’ in selecting the best 
private partner.
Innovation under this perspective is not or should not be limited to the 
ability of the procuring entities to acquire the ‘best-value’ products or services 
from innovative suppliers. Procuring entities must also be able to do it in 
the most efficient way, that is, at the time when the products or services are 
actual ly needed. Otherwise, no matter how innovative the products or services 
that are delivered by so-called innovative suppliers, if the products or services 
arrive after the fact, then their ‘use value’ diminishes in time. This may be one 
 (16) G.M. Di Guida and G.M. Racca, “From Works Contracts to Collaborative Contracts: The Chal-
lenges of Legal BIM”, Chapter 8 in this book.
 (17) See World Bank Group, “What are public private partnership?”, February 2018: “PPPs typi-
cally do not include service contracts or turnkey construction contracts, which are categorized as public 
procurement projects, or the privatization of utilities where there is a limited ongoing role for the public 
sector.”
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of the reasons why the concept of ‘amazon.gov’ even emerges, which is a topic 
covered by the chapter of McKeen.
McKeen shows us a picture of a future-scenario that is already unfolding: an 
official ordering goods to meet public requirements much as a private person 
would order home supplies from one of the biggest online markets, such as 
Amazon. The failure of a procurement system – even one from a highly-advanced 
economy such as the US – to address public requirements efficiently and well has 
triggered government support (in both Congress and the agencies) for a plat-
form for public procurement that is more expedient and more market-responsive 
at a presumably reasonable price, by attempting to simulate, if not necessarily 
adopt, the procurement processes in the “current commercial e-portal market” 
through the use of e-portals on a government wide basis. Whether this will 
in fact encourage innovative suppliers to participate in public procurement is 
yet to be seen. Or to pose a simple question, can a more liberalized model of 
public procurement promote more innovation? The risks of non-transparent 
algorithms and discrimination in commercial platforms remain and provide 
an  extraordinary incentive for promoting effective procurement systems using 
more traditional means.
1.3. Innovation in the Procurement Process
A third meaning is innovation in the procurement process itself as new 
methods and approaches for the procurement process. This introductory 
chapter, and the accompanying chapters by Locatelli, Simovart and Borodina, 
Pignatti, Ponzio, and McKeen, address these new approaches.
Locatelli discusses digitization, the use of self-declaration via a standard 
form European Single Procurement Document (ESPD), joint cross-border 
procurement (JCBPP) and cooperative procurement via institutional bodies 
(e.g. CPBs) as the main innovations under Directive 2014/24/EU on public 
procurement. He argues for the need for the EU Member States to go beyond the 
compulsory requirements of the Directives by combining full  digitization of the 
procurement process from planning to archiving (‘end-to-end  e-procurement’), 
and stresses the possibility of cooperation between large buyers in areas of 
mutual interest or between buyers not necessarily located in bordering areas 
(‘joint cross-border procurement’). Although public  procurement remains 
highly regulated, he explains that the novel approaches under the new 
Directives encourage the Member States to establish public procurement 
systems which may overcome market fragmentation and generate efficiencies 
and savings, and which can contribute to economic growth. He argues, 
importantly, that the Directives mark a pathway to improved procurement 
systems in the Member States.
BRUYLANT
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Since the transition to ‘digitized’ procurement process is becoming inevi-
table in EU Member States, i.e., the new directives call for the gradual 
yet mandatory transition of the initial phases in the procurement cycle to 
e-procurement, then the development of innovative procurement tools that 
will enhance efficiency in public procurement without compromising other 
procurement principles such as integrity, transparency, and competition 
is now a necessity. That objective can best be addressed by expanding the 
procurement networks among contracting officials across borders in order to 
share best practices that may be adopted or modified to meet the require-
ments not only of the end-users or the public in general, but, more impor-
tantly, to ensure compliance with the evolving regulations in procurement 
processes.
Simovart and Borodina give us a good example of the implementation of 
digitization under Directive 2014/24/EU using the Estonian e-Procurement 
Model (e-PR). They attribute the success of the e-PR (i.e., increasing the share 
of electronic procurement to 92% in 2016 and facilitating a smooth transfer to 
100% e-procurement soon) to the comprehensive nature of the whole electronic 
procurement environment, that is, e-PR not only supports full electronic award 
procedures (i.e., from pre-award phase to the awards of the contracts), it also 
contains an electronic register of complaints (i.e., registration of complaints is 
limited to the lists of the complaints submitted to the Complaints Board and 
the decisions made; submission of complaints is not yet included) as well as 
access to a user help and information portal (e.g., legal regulations on both EU 
and the national level, references to Court cases and summaries of case law 
of both the CJEU and Estonian Supreme Court, research conducted on the 
request or by the Ministry of Finance, etc.). Pignatti, on the other hand, elabo-
rates on various electronic tools that may be used within the entire procure-
ment cycle, which Ponzio supports by expounding on the best practices in 
innovative procurement across Eastern Europe. From another perspective 
Romeo, in her chapter on “Autonomy and Innovation in Italian Regional 
Procurement: The Sicilian Model” analyzes whether the European principles 
of opening the market and free competition can actually prevent various forms 
of barriers and/or possible discrimination in access to regional public procure-
ment markets.
Despite the various forms of innovation in public procurement, there is 
still a challenge in how other jurisdictions, most particularly those in deve-
loping countries and even some countries with emerging economies, might 
catch up with the innovations in public procurement among advanced econo-
mies such as the U.S. and the EU Member States. In fact, while ‘best value’ 
or Most Economically Advantageous Tender (MEAT) procurement is already 
a staple in advanced economies; that is, it is rare (in the U.S. federal market) 
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to see a complex procurement procedure that is not based on a “best-value” 
trade-off between quality and price, it is still a principle sometimes resisted 
among procurement specialists in developing countries where procurement is 
primarily based on ‘low-priced’ awards.
The evolution of the MEAT to a value‑based approach in specific sectors 
seems to be the future challenge for innovation. (18) The outcome-based 
healthcare model, for example, should provide a patient-centric approach with 
outcome measurements of the improvement both to the quality of care for 
patients and to the system in terms of sustainability (circular economy prin-
ciples) and efficiency, to assure the long‑term strength of healthcare systems.
The good news is that international organizations such as the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have international 
tools (e.g., the Methodology for Assessing Procuring Systems – MAPS) that 
are used to promote quality assurance, among other goals. MAPS was origi-
nally intended to protect the funds from OECD donor-countries that are being 
spent in developing countries from potential risks caused by those countries’ 
procurement systems; MAPS has, in fact, evolved into a quality-assurance 
tool for a more “innovative” procurement system in non-OECD countries. 
For a complete appreciation of the OECD MAPS, please refer to the chapter 
of Magina and Diesing on innovation in the evaluation of public procurement 
systems.
****
In our introduction here, we have decided to focus on innovative procure-
ment that crosses borders not only because it poses some of the toughest chal-
lenges in modern procurement, but also because it so successfully captures the 
other forms of innovation: cross-border procurement, while very innovative, 
also makes it easier for agencies to purchase innovative solutions emerging 
around the world, and nurtures innovative suppliers.
2. Innovation Through Cross-Border Procurement:  
Key Constraints
At present, probably the most ambitious innovation in procurement is ‘joint 
procurement’, either inside a country (overcoming the traditional coincidence 
 (18) See EURIPHI project (European wide Innovation Procurement in Health and Care) Consor-
tium (involving 14 PPOs, of which 10 have a regional or national remit and service providers from 6 coun-
tries who, together, procure for more than 200 care service providers), developing a Value-Based Procure-
ment of innovative solutions to enable the cross-border transformation of health and social care delivery.
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of the procuring entity that buys for itself) and the even more challenging 
cross-border procurement, which typically involves cross-border cooperation 
(often cooperation between public agencies, or central purchasing bodies) from 
different countries.
This type of cross-border cooperation is emerging around the world; in 
the United States, it is commonly referred to as ‘cooperative purchasing’, (19) 
while in Europe it is called ‘joint procurement’. In his chapter on cooperative 
purchasing in the United States, Kaufman discusses some of the U.S. strategies 
for cooperative purchasing among States – strategies that present, in many 
ways, illustrative examples of the same legal and management issues that dog 
joint purchasing in the European Union, described by Roberto Cavallo Perin 
with co-editor Gabriella Racca, Ivo Locatelli and Particia Valcarcel in their 
respective chapters.
The main focus here is on cross-border procurement, which presents ancient 
problems but offers remarkable promise for the future.
The 2014 Procurement Directive not only explicitly allows contracting 
autho rities to cooperate in joint cross-border procurement but forbids Member 
States to prohibit such possibility. It explicitly states that “[a] Member State 
shall not prohibit its contracting authorities from using centralized purchasing 
activities offered by central purchasing bodies located in another Member 
State”, and indicates that national law in conflict with these provisions would 
be in breach of the Directive. It is clarified that cross‑border procurement 
should not be used for the purpose of avoiding the application of national 
mandatory public law provisions. As with any European provision the Direc-
tive language endorses, cross border-procurement should not be applied with 
elusive, distorting illegal purposes. The same Directive recalls the legal and 
practical difficulties in purchasing from contracting authorities located in other 
Member States or jointly awarding public contracts; yet, it also recalls that the 
aforementioned cooperation was already possible according to common princi-
ples of cooperation.
The initial cross-border procurement supported by EU pilot projects saw 
the evolution from benchmarking to directed coordination, and eventually to 
the definition of common technical specifications related to separate proce-
dures, to award procedures delegated to other contracting authorities, and 
purchases of goods and services from delegated central purchasing bodies of 
other Member States or more recently through the establishment of European 
 (19) See, e.g., F. Trowbridge Vom Baur, “A Personal History of The Model Procurement Code”, 
Pub. Cont. L.J., 149, 1996, 168; id., “Early Days of Government Contract Practice”, Public Contract 
L.J., 1989, 18, pp. 446-459.
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joint subjects established under national or Union Law. (20) Also European 
Groupings of Territorial Cooperation (EGTCs) might fit the cooperation among 
CBPs from different countries for the purpose of establishing cooperation for 
joint cross-border procurement.
In the U.S., some examples of joint purchasing: cooperative purchasing, 
as made available to State, local and tribal governments by the U.S. federal 
government’s primary centralized purchasing agency, the General Services 
Administration (GSA), under GSA’s Multiple Award Schedules (MAS) contracts 
(the largest framework agreements in the U.S. federal government, worth tens 
of billions of dollars per year); and, cooperative purchasing made available 
to a broad variety of State and local agencies under the National Associa-
tion of State Procurement Officials (NASPO) ValuePoint contracts (which are 
described in much more detail in Justin Kaufman’s accompanying piece).
We should stress that we are drawing on selective examples here. Not all 
GSA frameworks agreements, for example, are available for cooperative 
purchasing; our focus here is only on the information technology agreements, 
which can be used by State and local purchasers in the United States. For an 
effective comparison, we will similarly focus on the information technology 
contract sponsored by NASPO-ValuePoint, the multi-billion-dollar contract 
which is run by the State of Minnesota on behalf of the other NASPO-Value-
Point members.
To gain a better sense of joint procurement’s future trajectory, the focus is on 
the institutional constraints that do so much to shape joint procurement. Those 
constraints also relate back to the first two types of innovation in procurement 
– though cross-border procurement is itself innovative, the constraints that 
slow this strategy make it more difficult to purchase innovative technology 
across borders, and to foster innovation among prospective contractors.
Cross-border procurement is inherently clumsy, because it requires different 
public agencies to reconcile and apply their sometimes radically different 
rules. While recent moves towards harmonization make it easier to recon-
cile different systems’ regulatory regimes, (21) stark differences remain, in 
part because those differences reflect divergent approaches to the social and 
political issues that often inform procurement law. At the end of the day, there-
fore, joint or cooperative purchasing (we will use the terms interchangeably) 
demands compromises between legal regimes.
 (20) In particular, art. 39, Dir. 24/2014/EU, includes “European Groupings of territorial cooperation 
under Regulation (EC) No. 1082/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council” among those joint 
entities which may be set up by “contracting authorities from different Member States” to carry out 
joint cross-border procurement.
 (21) See, e.g., United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), “Model Law 
on Public Procurement”, 2011; WTO, “Agreement on Government Procurement”, 2012.
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Despite the awkwardness inherent in cooperative purchasing, it does offer 
real promise as an innovative way forward.
Cross-border purchasing makes it possible to consolidate public purchasing 
demand in not one but many jurisdictions, and so makes it easier for public 
agencies to deliver higher quality, lower-priced goods and services to their 
constituent populations.
In the case of the European Union, cross-border procurement could become 
a strategic tool for strengthening the European single market, promoting 
capacity building among contracting authorities, and advancing social and 
environmental goals. (22)
The different perspectives that inform cooperative purchasing in the United 
States will become evident and of great interest especially as they show that 
the rules and principles of the European Directives on procurement deeply 
affect all levels of European procurement, from the national level to the 
smallest municipalities. This difference, as outlined already in our previous 
book, shows how from this perspective the European Union goes much further 
in fostering cross-border procurement than the U.S. federal government, with 
all the subsequent consequences.
The combined purchasing power and the possible goals of industrial policy 
of Member States, focused on specific sectors or in a much limited scale among 
public central purchasing bodies or even municipalities or regions from the 
same or different Member States, can be advanced through joint procurement.
Joint procurement, especially in the European context, does not neces-
sarily mean huge contracts but can promote specific strategies related to each 
relevant market. Such strategies may call for the division of requirements 
into smaller lots in order to encourage participation and the growth of SMEs, 
depending on how many economic operators are involved in any relevant 
procurement market.
Cross-border purchasing also might allow public agencies to leapfrog corrup-
tion and, from this perspective, there is a continuity with the previous book 
in this series (23) that focused on integrity and efficiency issues that, in this 
new and wider perspective, are always taken into account. A public buyer in 
a corrupt country, isolated in a sea of corruption, could in principle purchase 
from, through cross-border procurement instruments, a “clean” centralized 
 (22) R. Cavallo Perin and G.M. Racca, “European Joint Cross-border Procurement and Innova-
tion”, Chapter 3 in this book.
 (23) G.M. Racca and C.R. Yukins (eds), Integrity and Efficiency in Sustainable Public Contracts. 
Balancing Corruption Concerns in Public Procurement Internationally, coll. Droit administratif/Admin-
istrative Law Collection (J.-B. Auby dir.), Brussels, Bruylant, 2014. See also G.M. Racca, R. Cavallo 
Perin and G.L. Albano, “Public Contracts and International Public Policy Against Corruption”, in 
Transnational law of Public Contracts (M. Audit and S.W. Schill eds), Brussels, Bruylant, 2016, p. 845.
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purchasing agency in another jurisdiction, which would thus be in a stroke 
both bypassing and disabling a corrupt procurement system. Similarly, joint 
purchasing might permit procuring entities to face down cartels or unreason-
able fragmentations of the market in specific sectors.
Finally, and most practically, cross-border procurement allows public 
purchasers to diversify their supply chains, which sharply reduces the risk that 
those supply chains will collapse – or concomitantly, that prices will balloon 
out of control – when local emergencies or natural disasters strike, as inevi-
tably they do.
The promise of cross-border procurement must, of course, be weighed 
against its perils. Joint procurement faces severe constraints, some of which 
are detailed below. Those constraints impose practical limitations on cross-
border procurement, and – equally importantly, for our purposes here – suggest 
how lawyers and regulators should think critically about cross-border procure-
ment, as it expands in importance.
2.1. First Constraint: A Friendly Environment
The cross-border compromises inherent to joint procurement in turn present 
the first institutional constraint: only cooperative public bodies can embark on 
joint procurement together, which probably means that only friendly govern-
ments or other contracting entities, not adversaries, can engage in joint 
procurement.
Reciprocal defense procurement agreements between the United States and 
its allies (24) probably mark the outer boundary of this practical constraint: 
they demand technical cooperation in the purchase of defense materiel and 
supplies, to enhance interoperability in defense operations, which means as a 
practical matter that only allies, not enemies, can join these agreements. For 
many of the same reasons, Schoeni shows how it is probably no accident that the 
two most prominent examples, internationally, of cross-border procurement 
– in the European Union, and between States in the United States – arose in 
the context of stable systems, already politically and economically integrated.
As noted, one example for integration might be the European Grouping 
of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC). Interestingly, no similar integration is 
prevalent among U.S. States. EU Member States are encouraged to develop 
various forms of administrative cooperation towards an integrated system 
of public administrations for the enhancement of EU social cohesion. In fact, 
most EGTC structures remain within limited geographical areas (‘non-hostile 
 (24) See U.S. Department of Defense, “Reciprocal Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy 
Memoranda of Understanding”, October 2017.
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environments’) and particular sectors with ‘common economic interests’ that 
might also entail joint procurement activities. (25)
Conversely, this constraint – cooperative procurement works far better among 
friends – means that it probably will be much more difficult to use cross‑border 
procurement in hostile environments, such as in post-conflict circumstances or 
in countries experiencing hyper-corruption. Thus, for example, it would be very 
difficult for a schoolteacher in a war zone to purchase through a centralized 
purchasing agency in another, safer country; although the purchase itself might be 
done across the Internet, perhaps even on a mobile phone, the practical, legal and 
financial obstacles might well make the purchase unworkable or very difficult.
To overcome these challenges and fulfill the promise of cross‑border 
purchasing, much more careful attention will need to be paid to ‘ruggedizing’ 
joint procurement if it is to be extended to high-risk environments. To serve as 
a useful tool in hostile environments, cross-border purchasing should be made 
as simple as possible, and delivery and payment should be straightforward and, 
where necessary, secured through traditional means of assuring performance, 
such as stand-by letters of credit.
In considering these efforts to make cross-border purchasing work in 
hostile environments, purchasing authorities may wish to consider the elec-
tronic commerce model suggested by Section 846 of the U.S. National Defense 
Authorization Act for fiscal year 2018. (26) U.S. agencies will be pilot‑testing 
commercial electronic commerce platforms for purchases under the lowest 
threshold (roughly $10,000, and potentially much higher). This new approach 
– dubbed ‘amazon.gov’ by some – means that public purchasers will be able 
to buy directly from commercial marketplaces, bypassing traditional public 
procurement requirements for publication, qualification and competition. 
Despite misgivings by some, this new highly commercial approach might make 
it easier for government users in post-conflict or highly corrupt environments 
to purchase across borders. As already recalled the transparency issues with 
this approach have yet to be taken fully into account.
2.2. Second Constraint: The Context
The second, related constraint stems from the broader political, legal and 
administrative context in which public agencies undertake joint procurement 
– and while it is related to the first, this constraint highlights differences, not 
similarities.
 (25) R. Cavallo Perin and G.M. Racca, “European Joint Cross-border Procurement and 
Innovation”, Chapter 3 in this book.
 (26) See generally, U.S. General Services Administration, Procurement Through Commerical 
E­Commerce Portals Phase II Report: Market Research & Consultation, April 2019.
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Joint procurement in the European Union receives strong support from 
Brussels because (it is hoped) that cross-border cooperation in procurement 
will also help to develop internal market and to integrate the European States 
– the ultimate goal of EU policy. (27)
In the United States, in contrast, cooperative purchasing has grown as a 
means of reducing cost and improving procurement outcomes; there is almost 
no overarching goal of integrating the U.S. economy through cooperative 
purchasing.
These partially differing policy goals lead to different legal outcomes. While 
our focus here is on institutional issues, the rules reveal a great deal – like the 
wind’s ripples on a sand dune, the institutional forces seem to leave tracing 
marks on the legal rules that govern cooperative purchasing.
Take, for example, the legal issue of which procuring entity will bear the risk 
of transparency and competition – which entity, in other words, is ultimately 
responsible for ensuring that cross-border awards are done in a fair, competi-
tive and transparent manner. How that risk is allocated and addressed is an 
important measure of the rules governing a system of joint procurement.
The two U.S. models under study here (the GSA schedules and the NASPO 
ValuePoint vehicle) leave that risk largely with the customer agency. The GSA 
schedule contract says the risks of loss or damage to the supplies under the 
GSA contract typically will remain with the supplier until delivery, (28) while 
the ValuePoint contract shifts the risk of loss to the local customer agency.
While historically the NASPO ValuePoint contract might have read a 
local requirement into the contractual framework, the NASPO ValuePoint 
master agreement (the master framework agreement between a lead State 
and its vendors) was redrawn recently. Previously, the master price agree-
ment provided that if a customer agency’s laws required a specific provision 
– a provision mandating competition, for example – that provision would be 
read into the framework contract between a vendor and the purchasing agency 
– and the framework contract would take precedence.
That strong precedence for special local requirements has disappeared 
from the ValuePoint contracting system. The current master agreement now 
provides merely that the local jurisdiction’s direct contract with the contractor 
(the ‘Participating Addendum’) is to be interpreted consistently with local law; 
the revised contractual structure, however, gives no effect to local requirements 
not called out in the Participating Addendum. In practice, this means that if 
 (27) EU Comm., “Recommendation on the professionalisation of public procurement: Building an 
architecture for the professionalisation of public procurement”, C(2017) 6654 final, October 2017.
 (28) See, e.g., General Services Administration Federal Supply Service Authorized Federal Supply 
Schedule Price List, Contract No. GS-00F-0049M Ordering Period: 3/29/02 - 8/23/19, 37.
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the implementing contract is silent, local requirements – such as competition or 
transparency requirements – can be bypassed completely. What this means, in 
practice, is that the buying agency bears almost all risk of  compliance.
The GSA schedule contracts shift those burdens even more starkly to the 
State and local governments that use the GSA framework agreements under 
cooperative purchasing. This may be because cooperative purchasing was, to 
some extent, forced on GSA by Congress: GSA offers cooperative purchasing 
for only certain frameworks (such as information technology, Schedule 70), and 
even that arrangement had to be specially mandated by Congress.
The standard GSA schedule terms, which define certain obligations that are 
shaped by federal law and policy – how payment will be effected, for example – 
may be amended to accommodate non-federal customers (the payment clause, 
for example, can be modified to accommodate a local buyer standing in the 
shoes of a federal agency). Beyond that, though, the GSA acquisition regula-
tions cut the local or State framework agreement free from the master frame-
work agreements (the GSA MAS contracts): the regulations provide that a 
contract between a vendor and a buying agency forms a new contract, “which 
incorporates the terms and conditions of the Schedule contract” but under 
which the “U.S. Government shall not be liable”, whether for performance or 
nonperformance. (29) The GSA contracts, in short, do not resolve how local 
mandatory requirements should be addressed when local governments use 
these federal contracts.
The terms of the GSA schedule agreements, when applied to cooperative 
purchasing by State and local governments, thus reflect the federal govern-
ment’s very limited interest in integrating procurement regimes across the 
United States: the federal government is willing to allow State and local govern-
ments to economize by using (replicating, really) the GSA schedule contracts, 
but the federal government makes essentially no effort to use the framework 
agreements as an integrative tool. Conversely, in fact, the federal government’s 
‘hand’s-off’ approach shifts substantial transaction costs to customer agencies 
at the State and local levels (because they must fill all the contractual gaps left 
by the federal government), and (by neutralizing the robust federal framework 
agreements) can increase risks for using agencies.
The European Union’s main procurement directive suggests another way 
forward, one that reflects the European Union’s abiding interest in economic 
integration, and in joint procurement as a means of encouraging innovation. 
The European directive’s recital 71 states, in relevant part (with emphases 
added):
 (29) GSAR 552.238-79, 48 CFR § 552.238-79, Use of Federal Supply Schedule Contracts by Non-
Federal Entities.
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“Where several contracting authorities are jointly conducting a procurement 
procedure, they should be jointly responsible for fulfilling their obligations under 
this Directive. However, where only parts of the procurement procedure are 
jointly conducted by the contracting authorities, joint responsibility should 
apply only to those parts of the procedure that have been carried out together. 
Each contracting authority should be solely responsible in respect of procedures or 
parts of procedures it conducts on its own, such as the awarding of a contract, the 
conclusion of a framework agreement, the operation of a dynamic purchasing 
system, the reopening of competition under a framework agreement or the 
determination of which of the economic operator party to a framework agree-
ment shall perform a given task”.
From a U.S. perspective, the Directive’s allocation of responsibilities in 
joint procurement seems commonsensical: by allocating responsibility among 
the parties based on which party controls a particular step in the procedure, 
the Directive is following the same principle of ‘cheapest cost-avoider’ which 
is a staple of U.S. risk-allocation approaches. More markedly, the Directive’s 
allocation of responsibilities does not follow the approaches of the ValuePoint 
and GSA arrangements discussed above, which aggressively shift many more 
burdens to the State and local purchasing agencies. In Europe, by the same 
logic, national mandatory requirements should be applied in European joint 
cross-border procurement too.
Perhaps most importantly, though, the Directive’s recitals reflect an under-
standing in the European Union that remedying the allocation of risks and 
obligations between parties to a joint procurement should facilitate that cross-
border procurement. Recital 73 notes that joint procurement “by contracting 
authorities from different Member States” often encounters “legal difficulties 
concerning conflicts of national laws”, and as a result “contracting authori-
ties are still facing considerable legal and practical difficulties in purchasing 
from central purchasing bodies in other Member States or jointly awarding 
public contracts”. To ease these problems, the recitals suggest that in “order 
to allow contracting authorities to derive maximum benefit from the potential 
of the internal market in terms of economies of scale and risk‑benefit sharing”, 
new “rules on cross-border joint procurement should be established in order to 
facilitate cooperation between contracting authorities […] by creating cross-
border business opportunities for suppliers and service providers”.
The text of the Directive’s Article 39 goes a step further, and suggests a 
burden-allocation that could radically reshape the way that joint procurement 
is done – a reallocation apparently driven, again, by the institutional support 
in Europe for joint cross-border procurement and administrative cross-border 
cooperation.
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The Directive’s Article 39 shifts the center of gravity towards the selling 
agency (the centralized purchasing agency which coordinates the joint 
procurement), and says that the national laws of that centralized purchasing 
agency (including, presumably, national laws regarding competition and trans-
parency) will govern important steps through joint procurement:
“The provision of centralised purchasing activities by a central purchasing 
body located in another Member State shall be conducted in accordance with 
the national provisions of the Member State where the central purchasing body 
is located.
The national provisions of the Member State where the central purchasing body 
is located shall also apply to the following:
(1) the award of a contract under a dynamic purchasing system;
(2) the conduct of a reopening of competition under a framework agreement;
(3)  the determination pursuant to points (a) or (b) of Article 33(4) of which of 
the economic operators, party to the framework agreement, shall perform 
a given task”. (30)
Applying these European rules to the U.S. structures apparently would 
mean, for example, that an order awarded under a ValuePoint contract would 
be governed by the sponsoring State’s competition and transparency rules. 
Similarly, were this rule to apply in the United States, orders by State or local 
governments made through cooperative purchasing under the GSA schedules 
might be covered by strict federal competition and transparency rules, and 
could be subject to the federal government’s protective terms and conditions. 
The rule proposed by the Directive, in other words, could lend cooperative 
purchasing in the United States very important legal structure and protections.
Rather than leaving important elements of the contracting process unde-
fined – as ValuePoint and the GSA schedules do – the European rule, born 
of integration, could integrate joint cross-border procurement into mature, 
protective regulatory regimes. This could lead to effective harmonization 
of national implementations, through administrative cooperation and joint 
procurement experiences.
There could be practical effects, too, if the European rule were applied 
to U.S. forms of cooperative purchasing. The sponsoring agencies’ mature 
procurement systems – GSA’s relatively sophisticated means of ensuring 
competition and transparency for schedule orders, for example – could be 
extended, in practical terms, to orders by customer State or local governments. 
In the ValuePoint system, if the orders were subject to stricter and enforce-
able rules of competition and transparency, the sponsoring agencies would 
 (30) Dir. 24/2014/EU, Art. 39(3).
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have incentives to develop transparent and competitive ordering systems that 
customer agencies could use; in this way, ValuePoint orders by State or local 
governments could no longer be made ‘invisibly’. By making the sponsoring 
agency’s own rules applicable to cooperative purchasing, the European rule 
could, in effect, nurture contracting processes (transparency and competi-
tive ordering, for example) which took advantage of the sponsoring agencies’ 
mature contracting systems.
Those practical changes of course would need to take into account the 
third constraint we will discuss here: the nature of the sponsoring centralized 
purchasing agency itself. In assessing whether and how joint procurement 
should be regulated and directed, policymakers must be frankly conscious 
of the unique perspectives – and conflicts of interest – that the centralized 
purchasing agencies may bring to joint procurement.
The European pioneering experiences on joint procurement might take 
advantage of all the risks and challenges faced in the U.S. and promote the 
European goals through similar tools applying EU social goals.
2.3. Third Constraint: The Centralized Procurement Agencies
The third constraint relates to who is coordinating the joint purchasing (or 
joint procurement): the centralized purchasing bodies which carry their own sets 
of problems and pathologies. The using agencies which rely on joint procure-
ment typically are as disparate as their missions, from health to defense. In 
contrast, the selling agencies – the centralized purchasing agencies (bodies) 
that offer cross-border procurement – tend to be focused on common business 
imperatives of increasing sales, revenues and (sometimes) profits, in the U.S. 
experience. Again, in this perspective the European experience is still at the 
very early stages except for some more advanced experiences in national joint 
procurement. The strategic use of public procurement for industrial policy 
objectives, to drive sustainability and innovation, is highlighted in the text 
below as the next challenge.
The centralized purchasing agencies’ goals are not, of themselves, objection-
able; they do suggest, though, that prudent regulation may be needed in cross-
border procurement, because the central actors themselves may be distracted 
by institutional imperatives that are not resolved by the normal dynamics of a 
procurement market.
The two examples from the United States may help illuminate these 
points. The first is GSA, the centralized purchasing agency at the heart of 
the federal government which oversees tens of billions of dollars in annual 
purchases. GSA’s centralized purchasing function is sustained by user fees, not 
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appropriations, an institutional imperative which shapes GSA’s procurement 
strategies – including cooperative purchasing.
Because GSA has strong institutional imperatives to contain costs and risks, 
and because State and local governments across the United States present a 
geographically dispersed, fractured market outside GSA’s normal core mission 
of serving federal agencies, GSA has every incentive to contain its exposure 
to cooperative purchasing. The contracting system used to implement GSA’s 
cooperative purchasing reflects that approach: as was described above, while 
GSA allows State and local governments to use certain GSA schedule contracts 
through cooperative purchasing, GSA extends almost none of its normal legal 
protections or processes to those State and local government user agencies. 
GSA has, it seems, structured cooperative purchasing to minimize its own 
administrative costs and legal exposure.
The ValuePoint model offers its own lessons, informed by the unique 
posture of the State purchasing officers who shape the model. Their member-
ship organization, the National Association of State Procurement Officials 
(NASPO) is, after all, the sponsor of the ValuePoint model, NASPO earns fees 
from the ValuePoint contracts, centralized State purchasing agencies run the 
master framework agreements, and State agencies typically may buy from 
those agreements only if the State purchasing officers give their permission. 
The NASPO ValuePoint structure thus presents a welter of potential conflicts 
of interest; we will focus here on only one, as illustration, which manifests in 
ValuePoint’s heavy reliance on original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) 
rather than resellers.
Centralized purchasing agencies present a classic principal-agent conflict 
of interest problem in procurement: they are agent-intermediaries whose 
interests may diverge radically from those of user agencies. The centralized 
purchasing agencies that sponsor the ValuePoint master agreements are no 
different: while they have an interest in making goods and services available to 
customer agencies in other jurisdictions in order to spread administrative costs 
across more sales and enhance the agencies’ collective negotiating leverage 
with vendors, the sponsoring centralized purchasing agencies have an acute 
interest in reducing costs and legal exposure.
That self-interest in the sponsoring agencies helps explain why the Value-
Point information technology contract, which is used for billions of dollars in 
annual purchases, is limited to 30 OEMs. (The counterpart GSA Schedule 70 
information technology contract, in contrast, includes thousands of OEMS 
and resellers). The centralized purchasing agency implementing the Value-
Point contract has decided not to rely on resellers – typically smaller busi-
nesses which offer more diverse solutions, but which can present idiosyncratic 
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performance risks – and instead to contract only with OEMs, which natu-
rally limits competition and choice in the ValuePoint marketplace. The focus 
here is not on whether that trade-off makes sense, but rather on the fact that 
it is a trade-off – a conscious management decision driven by the centralized 
purchasing agency’s own posture and institutional imperatives, which may not 
yield optimal results.
The U.S. experience on central purchasing bodies through either the GSA 
model (sanctioned by the U.S. federal government) or the ValuePoint model 
(sanctioned by the participating States) points up the fact that the European 
Union does not have a ‘EU central purchasing body’ comparable to the GSA, 
but the U.S. experience suggests the importance of cooperation to reduce 
administrative costs and to consolidate public purchasing powers though with 
the same perils in potential conflicts of law.
It is interesting to learn how U.S. federal procurement, with all its sophis-
tication and efficiency, has not been a constraining model for most State and 
local procurements. The States generally maintain a separation from the 
federal government in terms of procurement means and goals. Aside from 
limited guidance for State and local procurements done with federal grants, 
there is no ‘Federal Procurement Directive’ to promote the opening of a ‘U.S. 
procurement market’, comparable to the EU Directives, which seek to open 
EU public procurement markets, with strategic goals underlying European 
procurement policy.
In fact, the European experience on joint cross-border procurement may be 
considered in an early stage when compared to the U.S. one, so that many of 
the issues are not yet manifested or have been solved through European princi-
ples or have been correctly addressed in the rules. In fact, most of the EU joint 
cross-border procurements were developed as pilot projects funded by EU 
funds. One may argue that the EU is trying to, so to speak, avoid the similar 
risks posed by the U.S. ‘umbrella contracts’, which is why it opts to learn from 
the pioneering experiences of cooperating EU Member States.
The actual aim is to encourage the ‘horizontal cooperation agreements’ of 
joint entities such as the ETCGs in order to take full advantage of a European 
single market for the benefit of the European citizens. Unlike the U.S., the EU’s 
approach in promoting joint and cross border procurement through central 
purchasing bodies is not only to ensure cost-savings but also to promote other 
goals such as encouraging cross-border participation of SMEs, counteracting 
cartels, assuring integrity and efficiency, furthering environmental and other 
social goals, and developing circular economy tools. Inte restingly, despite 
convergence, the EU’s perspective on “Unity in Diversity” allows EU Member 
States to promote those ‘other goals’, which can be shared cross-border on a 
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case by case basis and which could result in some of the same ‘trade-off’ issues 
that U.S. agencies are currently addressing.
2.4. Fourth Constraint: Language Barriers  
and Limited Procurement Professionals
Since cross-border procurement covers contracting authorities from 
different procurement entities in multiple States and local agencies, it calls for 
procurement professionals who are adept not only in their own procurement 
regulations and practices but also, potentially, in the regulations and practices 
of other procuring entities that use the cross-border procurement vehicle. As 
already discussed in the chapters of Kaufman, Cavallo Perin and Racca, cross-
border procurement poses challenges not only in addressing significant issues 
arising from variations in their procurement regulations and practices, but 
more importantly in managing cooperative contracts. Cross-border procure-
ment requires a balance between efficient delivery of products and services 
that offer best value for the government, and the need to ensure fair and open 
competition in a manner that is ethical and transparent. Procurement profes-
sionals must strike that balance while they continue to search for innovative 
ways of improving the acquisition process without violating the basic princi-
ples of fairness and competition. (31)
The 2017 European Commission report on cross-border trade in public 
procurement highlighted “unfamiliar legal context or formal requirements (e.g., 
contract, labor law, certificates to provide such as special permits necessary for 
offering services abroad etc.) leading to market entry barriers in awarding the 
country” and language barriers as two of the perceived obstacles to cross-border 
procurement by both the businesses (sell side) and the contracting authorities 
(buy side). (32) While a language barrier might not be an issue in cooperative 
purchasing among U.S. States, i.e., English is the common language irrespec-
tive of States and local agencies, it can be a big challenge among procurement 
professionals in EU Member States, since the EU has 24 official languages. (33) 
In fact, the EU small and medium enterprises (SMEs) regarded language 
barriers as the foremost barriers to cross-border procurement. (34)
 (31) D.A. Hindman III and R.N. Parker, “Piggyback Contracts: The Benefits and the Limits of 
Shared Purchasing”, Procurement Lawyer, 49, 3, p. 16.
 (32) EC, “Measurement of impact of cross-border penetration in public procurement”, February 2017.
 (33) There are currently 24: Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, 
French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, 
Romanian, Slovak, Slovene, Spanish and Swedish.
 (34) See also R. Williams QC, “Improving access for SMEs to cross-border defence procurement”, 
PPLR, 2017, 2, NA41‑NA42: “SMEs find it particularly difficult to access cross‑border defence contracts 
due to a lack of information, administrative burdens, language barriers, cultural, legal and administra-
tive differences between EU countries, and costs related to distance”.
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Nonetheless, professionalism in public procurement – the other and related 
constraint considered here – is not a new concept. In the United States, the 
 creation of a position for contract specialist, an upgrade from its previous 
 position as purchasing agent, began in 1959. In 1970, the U.S. Comptroller 
General emphasized the need “to develop a competent procurement  workforce 
with the capacity for exercising more initiative and judgement in making 
procurement decisions”. After a series of reports and recommendations, the 
U.S. Congress passed the Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA) in 1996 
which provided for the joint authority of the Administrator of the Office of 
Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) and the Director of the U.S. Office of 
Personnel Management (OPM) in establishing the specific requirements for 
contracting personnel. In 1997, OPM and OFPP jointly issued the new quali-
fication standards for contracting officials, that is, either a college degree or 
twenty‑four semester hours of study in specified business/legal subjects for 
entry level positions, and, both for all senior-level positions.
In 2015, the OECD recommended the development of a procurement work-
force with the capacity to continually deliver value for money efficiently and 
effectively by ensuring that procurement officials meet high professional 
standards for knowledge, practical implementation and integrity by providing 
a dedicated and regularly updated set of tools, for example, sufficient staff in 
terms of numbers and skills, recognition of public procurement as a specific 
profession, certification and regular trainings, integrity standards for public 
procurement officials and the existence of a unit or team analysing public 
procurement information and monitoring the performance of the public 
procurement system. (35)
More recently, the European Commission adopted a Recommendation 
on the Professionalisation of Public Procurement on October 3, 2017. The 
document enumerated a series of recommendations aimed at increasing the 
overall professionalism of contracting authorities/entities staff, and particu-
larly focusing on policy architecture, cooperation between and within public 
administrations, efficiency, transparency, integrity, careers and HR manage-
ment. (36) Interestingly, the Commission identified three lines of action in 
professionalisation: 1) developing appropriate policy architecture for profes-
sionalisation; 2) improving training and career management of procurement 
practitioners; and 3) providing tools and methodologies to support professional 
procurement practice. (37)
 (35) OECD, Recommendation to the Council on Public Procurement, 2015.
 (36) EC, Recommendation on the professionalisation of public procurement: Building an architec-
ture for the professionalisation of public procurement, 3.10.2017, C(2017) 6654 final, October 2017.
 (37) A. Solomonyan, “A soft tool for making public procurement more professional”, PPLR, 2018, 
1, NA3-NA4.
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Measures have been adopted to address these challenges, as in the case 
of the innovations related to the Tenders Electronic Daily (TED) common 
procurement vocabulary when drafting and publishing public procurement 
notices. (38) Cavallo Perin and co-editor Racca also emphasize the support to 
contracting authorities in overcoming linguistic barriers during the drafting 
stage of tender documents and contractual terms, while ensuring that these 
documents are available in different languages. (39)
In addition, new technologies have been introduced, both at the European 
and the national levels. As of 15 January 2016, an online machine transla-
tion service has been made available, free of charge, for all public procure-
ment notices published in Tenders Electronic Daily (TED), which is the online 
version of the Supplement to the Official Journal of the EU, dedicated to Euro-
pean public procurement. The development of ‘smart contracts’ through new 
technology may also favor new forms of cooperation with collaborative agree-
ments among suppliers and public administration with different legal and 
language background, aiming at a shared goal, i.e., the correct and prompt 
execution of public (smart) contracts. (40)
Tender documents offered in different languages can assure wider trans-
parency to facilitate cooperation which will strengthen the capacity of public 
administrations to pursue public interests, and further the objectives of 
growth, innovation and integrity of the European Union. (41)
Within this framework, innovative, joint and cross-border procurement 
represent unique chances to reshape the relevant systems and achieve a digital 
transformation towards modern, innovative and sustainable procurement 
systems fit for the 21st century.
3. Conclusion
This brings us full circle, then, to the purpose of this book: to foster cri tical 
discussion of innovation in procurement. In the case of cross-border joint 
procurement, as the discussion above reflects, important issues – the govern-
ments and the contracting entities which can cooperate, the legal and political 
 (38) R. Williams, “European Communities: proposed adoption of mandatory common procurement 
vocabulary”, PPLR, 2002, 2, pp. 19-20.
 (39) E.g., in the HAPPI project, the documents were available in the English, French and Italian 
languages. For further information on the HAPPI project, see also R. Cavallo Perin and G.M. Racca, 
“European Joint Cross-border Procurement and Innovation”, Chapter 3 in this book.
 (40) G.M. Racca, “The role of third parties in the execution of public contracts”, in Contrôles et 
contentieux des contrats publics / Oversight and Challanges of public contracts (L. Folliot-Lalliot and 
S. Torricelli eds), Brussels, Bruylant, 2018, p. 415.
 (41) EU Commission, Making Public Procurement work in and for Europe, COM(2017) 572 final, 
October 2017, p. 7.
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imperatives which will inform that procurement, and the institutional biases of 
the sponsoring agencies, among others – are only now being assessed. To make 
cross-border procurement work, those issues need to be recognized and, where 
possible, addressed; as the discussion above shows, and as this volume more 
generally shows, perspectives from other systems will, we hope, ease those 
solutions.
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